Abstract
1 Introduction 2 The empirical evidence corroborates supply-side models. Queiro (2016) presents evidence that managerial education has a significant effect on firm size while Cabral and Mata (2003) find that experience is an important factor in determining firm size.
status of managers, technical abilities, machinery, and financial capital.
After this step, the project enters its first phase: acceptance of bids from firms. There are 110 two ways used to notify firms of a new project. First, the system sends automatic notifications to 111 providers. It does so through an algorithm that compares the requirements listed in the project 112 with the competencies of providers. In addition to contacting providers directly, the system also 113 posts the project on the database of the portal. During this stage, all registered providers are able 114 to search and browse through the available projects and express their interest.
In the second phase of the process, all providers that bid on the project must provide proof 116 that they fulfill the requirements specified. They do this by uploading official documentation to
117
Compraspublicas. For instance, if the project requires specific machinery, then providers must 118 upload the registration and proof of purchase of the equipment. A notable feature of this part of 119 the process is that the requirements for each public work are objective and, in some cases, the 120 system does not allow the provider to complete this phase if they do not meet the minimum cutoffs.
121
Following this phase, a committee from the public institution evaluates all the providers that 122 presented a bid. The committee's responsibility is to identify if each firm meets the minimum 123 requirements for the project-thus supplementing the verification process done by the system. To experience. An interior design firm could, theoretically, qualify for this process. In this case, it is 126 the role of the committee to verify if the experience listed by the firm is relevant. The committee 127 does not rank nor provide a numerical qualification of providers; it only determines if they are 128 qualified to perform the project. The providers that qualify enter into a pool. In the final phase of 129 the process, the system automatically and randomly selects one provider from the list of qualified 130 providers. This provider is the winner of the contest and is given the contract for the project.
131
The identification strategy in this study relies on the fact that the allocation of the contract 132 is random. For a given public contract all providers that qualify to participate in the lottery 133 have, on average, comparable characteristics. The impartiality of the procurement process is 134 ultimately an empirical question, and is addressed in the empirical section, where it is concluded 135 that menor cuantia projects are, indeed, randomly assigned. Moreover, and regardless of any 136 empirical considerations, there are two major features of the process that suggest that contracts 137 are assigned randomly.
138
First, no negotiation between institutions and firms takes place at any stage. The price for a 139 given public work is predetermined and, as a result, no preference is given for one bid being more 140 5 During 2012 additional rules were added to the system that prevented certain providers from submitting bids.
These rules were not in place during the time period used in this study.
competitive than another. This is evidenced by comparing the budgeted and actual costs for a given project. In the menor cuantia process these values always coincide. In public work projects 142 of higher amounts, which are allocated using different procedures, one can observe considerable 143 variations between the estimated and actual costs. Second, the requirements that are set for each 144 contract, while reducing the heterogeneity of firms that qualify, are defined in terms of objective 145 criteria and must be verified by legal documents. algorithm. The appendix provides a comprehensive overview of how the data gathering process.
[ Table 1 6 A potential concern is the discretion the committee has to qualify providers. A committee might try to provide preferential treatment to a firm by being stringent in their review of other firms and thus limiting the number of qualified providers. To overcome this potential limitation, I exclude from the sample a firm if, during any contest, it was the only one qualified into the pool. The purpose of this study is to estimate the causal effects of demand shocks on firm growth. To A micro firm has between 1 and 9 employees and gross sales and assets of less than $100,000. A small firm has between 10 and 49 employees and sales and assets between $100,000 and 1 million dollars. A medium firm has between 50 and 99 employees and sales between 1 and 2 million dollars. 10 A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 90% of firms have less than 3-7 permanent employees. 11 The remaining 16 public works were terminated unilaterally. There is no information that describes the reasons for the termination. In the robustness section, I exclude those providers that participated in those contests.
fixed and current assets. following reduced-form model: is exogenous.
202
The increase in demand caused by winning a menor cuantia contests provides the source counter factual to obtain the effects of demand shocks on growth.
207
There are two main concerns with using the contracts allocated under menor cuantia as an 208 exogenous source of demand. The first concern is that the lottery may not be random. This 209 would occur if companies or the public institutions were able to manipulate the system. The 210 second concern is participation. Firms can submit bids for multiple projects on a given year. To 211 participate in a lottery, each firm must qualify to enter into the pool. If more productive firms 212 qualify to more contests, then the probability of winning under the process increases. In this case,
213
even if contracts are allocated using a lottery, they are not exogenous to firm characteristics.
214
These concerns can be tested empirically. The probability of winning a contest at time t should 215 be orthogonal to any firm level characteristics observed at time t−1. 
I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate equation 2 on the the extensive margin, by comparing 229 winners of the contest with those that did not win. In this specificationẏ it is the measure of 230 growth for company i at time t, d it equals 1 if the firm wins a contract during the year t and 0 231 otherwise, and X it represents firm specific controls. I include as controls age and location of the 232 firm, a vector of controls that account for geographic characteristics, and regional GDP indicators.
233
All specifications control for time and region fixed effects.
234
In the second step, I estimate the effect of demand shocks on the intensive margin. To measure 235 the intensive margin, I estimate equation 2 defining d it to be the log of sales from menor cuantia.
236
The coefficient β 1 shows how percent changes in exogenous demand affect different measures of 237 firm growth. To estimate if demand shocks have an effect beyond the year of the shocks, I look at 238 growth at different time intervals,ẏ it+i ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. 14 The probability of winning a contest is inversely proportional to the number of providers that qualified to the contest. 15 This is of particular importance given that the preferential procurement programs that create the demand shocks have been presented as facilitating growth. For instance, an increase in cash flow due to additional demand might alleviate budget or credit constraints. This might motivate firms to invest in capital or labor.
asset during the year that the shock occurs. Nonetheless, it is still plausible to observe no differences between winners and runner-ups of the contest during the year of shock. lower a magnitude and statistical significance.
274
[ received from menor cuantia. Table 5 presents the estimation results.
278
[ assets and suggest that an increase of 10% in the demand will increase wage expenses by 20%.
289
Overall, the results from the intensive margin analysis are similar in magnitude and significance
290
to the ones presented in table 4.
291
Next, I examine the duration of the effects. This is of particular relevance given that the changes 292 observed could be due to short-term reasons such as hiring more labor to fulfill the contract or 293 renting machinery required for a project. Figure 2 shows the differences in growth rates between 294 firms that won a menor cuantia contract and those that did not. The differences are shown for 295 the first three years after the contest. The figure shows the coefficient for growth estimated using 296 equation 2 with the 95% confidence interval. The dependent variable is the growth rate in gross 297 revenues, wage expense, and fixed and current assets. The figure reveals two significant insights.
298
First, the year after the shock, winners of the menor cuantia contest experience a decrease is gross 299 revenues and current assets. The decrease the year after the shock is similar in magnitude than 300 the increase experienced the year of the shock. No effect is observed the year after the shock for 301 labor costs and fixed assets. Second, no effects in any measure of growth are observed two years 302 after the shock.
303
[ Figure 2 about here.]
304
One non-pecuniary benefit of winning a contract is that it gives firms experience, reputation, and contacts in the procurement process. In this case, it is possible for winning firms to increase 306 their sales to the government outside of the menor cuantia process. In this section I perform several empirical tests to check the menor cuantia assignment mechanism.
387
I start by constructing a theoretical distribution of the number of times that participants are 388 expected to win a contest and compare this, using a χ2 test, with the realized distribution. It 389 is important to note that the process involves both firms and individuals and as a result, I use 390 all participants for this exercise. The construction of the theoretical distribution is based on the 391 fact that the probability of winning a contest is inversely proportional to the number of qualified 392 providers.
393
For any contest j held at time t, let d kjt = i, i ∈ {1, 0} be an indicator variable taking value 1 394 if the provider k wins the contest and 0 otherwise. For each individual contest j, the probability 395 of winning is the inverse of the number of participants n that qualify to enter P (d j = 1) = Note also that the process implies that events should be independent of time. As a result, it 409 is expected that winning a contest during t − 1 should not affect the probability of winning the 410 contest at time t.
Proposition 3 Winning a contest during year t does not affect the probability of winning a contest during 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) where t = k was less than five. I fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
419
[ Proposition 3 is tested using a similar mechanism as in proposition 2 but only include those 421 providers that qualified for a given contest in two given years. Results are presented in table C.3.
422
I fail to reject the null hypothesis on all three cases at the 10% level.
423
[ and other information. This file, however, did not provide the level of detail needed for the project.
444
To obtain this additional information, a personalized data scrap code searched and downloaded all 445 the meta-data. This required doing a personalized search for each public work in the sample. The
446
gathering was restricted to the purchases which 1) were finalized 2) had a unique id number and 3) were awarded to only one contractor. 28,957 out of the total 32,551 public works in the menor 448 cuantia met this criteria and form the universe of public works for the project.
449
The process above was done in three different batches during the year 2015. The first batch was website.
468
Repeated requests to obtain the data on companies went unanswered. As a result, an automated obtain the financial data from the structured document, I ran several scripts to do so automatically.
474
To obtain data from the scanned images, it was necessary to enter the information manually. For 475 this, I adopted the help of several research assistants.
476

C.3 Phase III
477
In this phase of the project I had to enter the financial information into a database. Financial 478 information after 2011 was available in a PDF format. The data from this file was extracted 479 using an automated scripts. Figure 3 provides a sample of the balance. For balances that were 480 scanned copies of documents, the data was entered manually and verified by at least an additional 481 worker and was tested using accounting principles. Figure 4 and figure 5 provide an example of 482 the financial information available as scanned documents.
483
The final phase involved testing all information gathered to ensure it was consistent. First, to 484 ensure that all public works were collected accurately, a manual check was done on 300 randomly
485
18 In order to minimize the risk of skipping some companies, I performed the scraping 3 times on those companies I was not able to find.
selected public works. A second check was ensuring that the costs indicated in the master file were 486 consistent with the one indicated on each public work. Additionally, each public work was entered 487 into a SQL database which ensured that public works were only entered once and that any major 488 integrity problem was identified.
489
[ Figure The figure above contains average growth rates t + k, k ∈ (1, 2, 3) years after winning a contract under the menor cuantia process. Growth is defined as the log differences. The bars represent the 95% confidence interval. The figure was created using the results from estimating equation 2 by least squares. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Controls include age of the firm, the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during the year, the size of a firm, local GDP and construction permits issued during the year.
Figure 3: Sample financial information
The figure above presents a financial return from a firm in the sample, available as a structured format. The data from this balance can be obtained from an automated script.
Figure 4: Sample financial information
The figure contains a financial return available as scanned copies. The data from this balance was obtained viamanual entry.
Figure 5: Sample financial information
The figure contains a financial return available as scanned copies. The data from this balance was obtained viamanual entry. 1 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables is growth (log differences) of: revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is reported in years. Contest participated refers to the numbers of contests that a firm qualified for during the year. The size of a firm are a set of dummies that control for the size (as defined by the bureau of companies of Ecuador) of the firm. The regional controls include: local GDP and construction permits issued during the year. P values * p < .1, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables is the growth, defined as (
.5 * (yt+yt−1) ) of: revenue (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is reported in years. P values * p < .1, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01 Least squares estimation of the effects of winning a procurement contract on firm growth. The dependent variables is are the log dollar amount (as reported in the balance sheet) of revenues (columns 1 and 2), wage expense (columns 3 and 4), fixed assets (columns 5 and 6), and current assets (columns 7 and 8). The variable winner is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm won a contest at time t and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level. Age of a firm is reported in years. P values * p < .1, * * p < .05, * * * p < .01
